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ABSTRACT:  
Each economic actor is characterized by his own evaluations, traits, and strategies. Although 
heterogeneity of economic actors is widely acknowledged, little is known about the factors 
causing it. In this paper, we will examine the behavioral bias known as myopic loss aversion, and 
the environmental and psychological factors leading to different behavioral reactions. Myopic 
loss aversion has been used to suggest that fund managers should reveal information only rarely, 
to lead investors to choose options with (on average) higher returns.  
Specifically, we experimentally studied the impact of experience, individual differences, and 
emotions on behavioral responses to feedback frequency in an investment setting. Participants 
made investment decisions in one of three feedback frequency conditions: (1) they received 
feedback after each round and had the opportunity to make investment changes each time; (2) 
they received feedback after each round, but were only given the possibility to make changes 
every three rounds; and (3) they received aggregated feedback every three rounds, and also had 
the opportunity to make changes every three rounds. We collected information about personality 
and individual difference factors before the experiment. Finally, evaluations and emotions were 
measured every three rounds, immediately after feedback was given. 
We hypothesized that myopic loss aversion is not a general phenomenon, but that stable 
individual differences lead to different evaluations and emotional reactions concerning feedback. 
This implies that myopic loss aversion will only be present for some groups of people under 
certain conditions. As predicted, we found that myopic loss aversion is not generally observed; 
rather, we found both an experience effect and a personality effect. In particular, myopic loss 
aversion was particularly likely: (1) when initial investment rounds lead to negative investment 
experiences (i.e., losses); and (2) for investors with low self-efficacy concerning the investment 
situation. „Self efficacy‟ is related to a personality profile characterized by confidence in 
decision-making abilities, high optimism, and low anxiety. Our results may help explain which 
individual and situational factors lead to myopic loss aversion, and should help researchers and 
practitioners provide optimal feedback to different types of investment clients. 
JEL: D14, D53, D81, G11, C91 
# 
Corresponding author for the review process. This is an interdisciplinary project between economics and psychology, 
and both authors contributed equally to the research. Please address questions to both corresponding authors. 
* We would like to thank Natascha Michel for programming the experimental interface and Cristina Rivera for the 
excellent help running the experiments. Financial support through a NETSPAR research grant awarded to Astrid 
Hopfensitz and Tanja Wranik is gratefully acknowledged.  
PSYCHOLOGICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL DETERMINANTS OF MYOPIC LOSS AVERSION 
 2/29 
1. Introduction 
"No two people see the external world in exactly the same 
way.  To every separate person a thing is what he thinks it 
is -- in other words, not a thing, but a think" 
Penelope Fitzgeralde 
 
It is an undisputed reality that each economic actor is characterized by a unique set of 
abilities and characteristics. In the past, these differences were regarded as “interesting” 
due to their role in motivating market interactions and stimulating gains from mutual 
trade. More recent research, however, has stressed the importance of economic actor 
heterogeneity, and some have proposed multi-agent approaches to analyze models 
involving trait heterogeneity (Axtell, 2007). To make these models optimally predictive, 
we now need to identify the most salient traits and strategies within the population for 
specific economic behaviors.  Examples for heterogeneity in traits concerning economic 
behavior include: sophisticated versus naive trading; and responders versus non-
responders to explain information processing abilities in financial markets (Haltiwanger 
& Waldman, 1985; 1991); sensitivity concerning deviations with respect to others for 
bargaining outcomes (Fehr & Schmidt, 1999); and risk aversion (Holt & Laury, 2002). 
Although in some cases individual differences have been identified, most economic 
experiments and studies still analyze results at an aggregate level. This might be because 
underlying heterogeneity indicators and processes are difficult to understand. 
Consequently, one of the challenges is to identify factors that can explain and predict 
stable individual differences. In this paper, we will present an experimental study that has 
identified individual differences in a financial investment setting, and which shows that 
the origin of these differences can be both situation dependent, environmental factors as 
well as stable, individual differences. 
Researchers in the area of Personality and Social Psychology
1
 attempt to tease apart 
individual differences and situational factors to explain behaviors within important social 
domains, and recently including consumer and economic behavior (De Cremer, 
Zeelenberg, & Murnighan, 2006). However, very few studies have combined 
psychological models with behavioral differences in economic interactions (Biais et al., 
2005). Given the increased interest by economists to use psychological theories and 
methods that measure neurological (Sanfey et al., 2003), physiological (Ben-Shakhar et 
al., 2007) and biological (Kosfeld et al., 2005) reactions, it is also desirable that 
economists and psychologists work together to determine which psychological measures 
are best suited to help us understand economic behaviors. For example, neurological, 
physiological, and biological factors may seem objective; however, they generally only 
provide rough mean descriptions and correlates of economic behavior, without explaining 
underlying processes and causes (Frijda, 2007). In addition, both standard economic 
models and neurological or physiological measures filter out useful intra- and inter-
individual variation. Although such mean estimates are interesting for basic model 
building, the inclusion of individual differences should allow us to open up the black box 
                                                 
1
 For more information about this field, please see http://www.spsp.org  
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of decision-making and build more specific models that take into consideration both 
situation-specific and person-specific information.  
In this paper, we will investigate the behavioral bias of myopic loss aversion, which is 
crucial for long-term investment decision-making, and which has been repeatedly 
observed in experimental studies (Gneezy & Potters, 1997; Thaler et al., 1997). We 
predicted and observed strong individual differences that might or might not lead to the 
typically observed reactions for myopic loss aversion. Moreover, we identified individual 
traits that lead to these reactions, and provide insights into the underlying mechanisms of 
myopic loss aversion. Finally, we will show that similar behaviors can be caused by 
environmental factors. Taken together, our results will allow us to propose possible 
solutions to diminish the effects of myopic loss aversion. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we will give an overview of 
the existing literature on myopic loss aversion. Section 3 will review the psychological 
literature concerning individual differences, emotions, and evaluations and make 
predictions concerning different personality types. Section 4 will present the design and 
procedures of the study. Section 5 will present behavioral results across treatments and 
identify individual differences in evaluations and emotions that could account for them. 
Section 6 will conclude. 
2. Myopic loss aversion 
The fact that investment in stocks is lower than realistic levels of risk aversion would 
predict (known as the „equity premium puzzle‟), has been widely discussed in the 
financial and economic literature (Mehra & Prescott, 1985). Numerous explanations for 
this anomaly have been proposed, one of which is the principle of myopic loss aversion 
(Bernartzi & Thaler, 1995). Myopic loss aversion is based on the principle of (1) loss 
aversion (Kahneman & Tversky 1979; Tversky & Kahneman 1992), due to which losses 
loom larger than gains, and (2) mental accounting (Kahneman & Tversky 1984; Thaler 
1985) i.e., a thematic grouping of expenses and gains.  
Risky investment options that show on average high returns are usually characterized by 
short term losses, which will be cancelled out by occasional gains in the long run. An 
overvaluation of losses compared to gains can render such an investment less attractive, 
compared to a safe investment option with lower average returns but less volatility. Less 
frequent feedback might increase the attractiveness of a risky asset by presenting only 
aggregate gains. The effect of feedback from investment and its impact on investment has 
been experimentally studied by economists (Gneezy & Potters, 1997; Thaler et al., 1997) 
and psychologists (Shiv et al., 2005a; 2005b). These studies confirm that investment in 
risky, high return options is higher when aggregate feedback over a number of rounds is 
given (Barron & Erev, 2000; Gneezy & Potters, 1997; Thaler et al., 1997) and that prices 
for such an option will be higher (Gneezy et al., 2003). This bias is not simply due to 
inexperience; professional traders show similar behaviors as non-professionals (Haigh & 
List, 2005). Some have therefore suggested that fund managers should give portfolio 
performance information less frequently to induce higher investment levels; a 
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recommendation that may have already resulted in information policy changes (Gneezy 
et al., 2003). 
The principle of myopic loss aversion is based on the assumption that losses „feel‟ worse 
than equally sized gains, which points at the importance of emotions for this type of 
decision. Moreover, patients with focal lesions in brain areas related to emotions react 
less strongly to losses and show higher average investment in risky situations than normal 
controls (Shiv et al, 2005a; 2005b). These results suggest that individual differences in 
emotional reactions might influence investment choices. However, to date neither 
individual differences nor emotional reactions in connection with frequent or infrequent 
investment feedback has been explicitly studied. 
The aim of this study is to determine the relation between the display of myopic loss 
aversion and personality. We therefore measured character traits as well as evaluations 
and emotions in an experimental investment game. An analysis of the interaction of 
events (earnings and losses), emotional reactions, and behaviors (amount invested) 
should allow us to identify external circumstances as well as personality factors that are 
likely to lead to myopic loss aversion.  
To make our results easily comparable to the existing experimental literature, we used the 
design proposed by Gneezy and Potters (1997). We also included a third treatment to 
disentangle feedback effects from investment flexibility effects (cf. Bellmare et al., 
2005). Because behavior can differ significantly when specific parameters are changed 
(Langer & Weber, 2001; 2005), we applied the same probabilities and outcomes as these 
earlier studies. 
3. Evaluations, personality, and decision making 
Contemporary emotion theory suggests that the same situation, such as a monetary win or 
loss, can result in very different emotions (Ellsworth & Scherer, 2003). This is because 
emotions do not emerge from situations, but rather from the subjective evaluations a 
particular individual ascribes to the situation. For example, a loss will bring about strong 
negative emotions, such as anger, if the person expected to earn a lot and believes that he 
or she “deserves” to earn the money, or if he believes that another agent treated him or 
her unfairly. However, the same loss could bring about mild irritation or even 
indifference if the person believes that the investment was a gamble with only minor 
earning chances. These evaluations are considered a crucial link between situations or 
events and the ensuing emotional and behavioral reactions. Thus, although losses tend to 
lead to negative emotions and earnings to positive emotions, the specific emotional 
reaction can be quite varied and will be based on theses subjective evaluations. 
Because evaluations are subjective and inherently personal, it seems logical that stable 
individual difference should systematically influence these evaluations and therefore the 
ensuing emotions (Wranik, 2005). For example, a person who strongly believes in fair 
treatment will be more sensitive to unequal shares or gains. This person will evaluate 
many situations as unfair, and be more likely to feel angry than a person who believes 
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that life in inherently unfair and expects to be treated unfavorably most of the time. Past 
research has examined several predictions concerning which individual differences 
should influence which evaluations and found support for this proposition concerning a 
number of factors in various experimental settings (Griner & Smith, 2000; Van Reekum 
& Scherer, 1997; Wranik & Scherer, 2008). Research in workplace settings has referred 
to the fundamental, subconscious conclusions individuals reach about themselves, other 
people, and the world as “core evaluations” (Judge et al., 1998).  
Systematic evaluation biases, such as expectations, beliefs, and attributions, are crucial 
for the decision-making process in general and should therefore play a large role in 
understanding investment decision-making. Indeed, researchers have identified a range of 
personality and emotional processes and variables that may systematically influence 
investment decisions including self-efficacy, optimism, emotion regulation, impulsivity, 
pessimism, anxiety, and irritation (Ellis, 2002; Hilton, 2001; Salovey, 2001); however, 
there is still very little empirical evidence to determine the impact and importance of 
these variables (for exceptions, see Ameriks et al., 2007 and Wranik et al., 2008). A 
systematic examination of the interaction between individual differences, evaluations and 
emotions in the investment situation is beyond the scope of this paper and is treated in 
more detail in Wranik and Hopfensitz (2008). In this paper, we will focus our discussion 
on the core evaluation that we expected to predict myopic loss aversion; namely, self-
efficacy.  
We will use validated personality scales and evaluation questionnaires to determine if and 
how feedback frequency of investment returns influence individuals with high and low 
self-efficacy. Based on past research, we have defined self-efficacy as a core evaluation 
which includes general optimism, specific confidence in decision-making abilities, and 
lack of anxiety (Judge et al. 1998). In particular, optimistic persons tend to look 
positively into the future and will continue to hope for future earning despite past losses 
(Carver & Scheier, 2002). Similarly, persons who believe in their ability to make good 
decisions will try to minimize losses and also look to the future for more earning 
possibilities. This construct is similar to task-specific self-efficacy, which predicts that 
people will persevere in the face of hardship and initial failure in a task (Bandura, 1997). 
Finally, nervous or anxious persons are generally sensitive to uncertainty and therefore 
prefer to avoid risk (Maner & Schmidt. 2006). Taken together, individuals with general 
optimism, specific confidence in decision-making abilities, and lack of anxiety should 
evaluate losses as less negative, report weaker or less negative emotions, and be less 
influenced by feedback frequency (Seligman & Csikszentmihalyi, 2000). They should 
also be future-oriented and present less myopic loss aversion.  
4. Experimental design, procedures and predictions 
To allow comparison with earlier results, our experiment was based on the research 
designs by Gneezy and Potters (1997) and Bellemare et al. (2005). In the baseline 
treatment, participants faced 15 consecutive investment rounds
2
.  Participants received 
100 points for each round, which could be fully or partially invested into one of two 
                                                 
2
 In Gneezy and Potters (1997) as well as in Bellemare et al (2005) only 9 rounds were played. 
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options. Earnings from previous rounds could not be used for future investment.
3
 One of 
the two investment options was safe (i.e., every point invested in this option would be 
added to the final earnings), and the other option was risky. The risky option returned the 
invested points multiplied by 3.5 with p=1/3, and returned nothing in 2/3 of the cases. 
Thus, participants could either earn 2.5 times their investment (relative to the points they 
had received at the beginning of the round) or lose their investment. To make losses 
salient, the instructions and computer interface clearly stated that participants had an 
initial amount of capital which they could either keep or invest. The expected value of the 
risky option was therefore larger than the expected value of the safe option.
4
 
We compared the baseline treatment with two treatments based on Bellemare et al. 
(2005). In the baseline treatment, participants had to make a new investment decision in 
each round and received investment performance feedback after each round. We 
therefore called this treatment High (short for „high feedback‟). In contrast, participants 
in the Low treatment („low feedback‟) were required to fix their investment choice for 
three consecutive rounds and received aggregate feedback about their returns from these 
three rounds. Finally, to disentangle the effects of feedback from those related to the 
opportunity to change the amount invested, we included a third treatment. In this Medium 
treatment, participants again fixed their investment choice for three consecutive rounds; 
however they received feedback every round. Thus, these participants would see if they 
won or lost in each of the 15 rounds, but they could only make a new decision every three 
rounds.   
Since the aim of our study was to identify individual differences, evaluations, and 
emotions underlying myopic loss aversion, we asked participants to respond to 
questionnaires before and during the task. First, they filled out several questionnaires to 
asses their personality and other individual differences (see Appendix B:5). This was 
done during a separate one-hour session, which took place approximately one week 
before the experimental session. We thereby ensured no carry-over effects from the 
questionnaires onto the behaviors in the experiment. During the experimental session, we 
measured baseline evaluations and emotions before the first investment round (see Figure 
1). Then, every three rounds, after receiving feedback concerning their investment, 
subjects were asked to: (1) indicate and rate the most prominent emotion they 
experienced; (2) answer a number of questions concerning evaluations of past and future 
rounds.  
Evaluations reflect an individual‟s subjective evaluation of situations and events, and can 
therefore only be measured by self-reports. Even though the use of self-reports is 
frequently regarded with skepticism by experimental economists, their use is necessary 
whenever internal, non-observable states are measured. Moreover, studies employing 
physiological measures suggest the consistency and reliability of these reports (van 
Reekum et al., 2004).  
                                                 
3
 By keeping participants endowment fixed over rounds, we circumvent problems due to differences in 
budget constraints across participants. 
4
 EV(risky) = 1.16 > EV(safe) = 1 
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Procedures 
The experiment was conducted in computer laboratories at the University of Geneva, 
Switzerland. Participants were recruited by announcements promising a monetary reward 
and were asked to sign up for two one-hour sessions. The first was a questionnaire 
session; the second was the experimental session in which participants completed the 
investment task. Participants were paid their earnings from the investment task plus a 
show up fee of 10 CHF at the end of the second session. Average earnings were 32 CHF 
(approx. $ 27). In total 114 students (age: M = 24, SD = 5.75; 71 female, 43 male) from a 
variety of fields (psychology, economics, law) participated in the experiment.  
During the first session, participants were informed that they would have to fill out a 
number of questionnaires concerning their personality. It took participants between 40 to 
60 minutes to answer all the questionnaires. To match answers from the two sessions, 
participants also had to provide personal information
5
 (i.e., first letter of their father‟s 
name, first letter of their mother‟s name, the day of their birthday, and the month of their 
birthday) which was used to create a personal identifier and which participants had to 
provide again during the second session.  
At the beginning of the second session, participants were informed that they would 
participate in an investment game in which they could earn points that would be 
converted to real money at a specified exchange rate at the end of the session. They 
received 20 CHF (i.e., 1500 points) as initial capital and were handed the money in 
envelops. This money was the capital that could be used in the 15 rounds of the 
investment game. In each round, participants made decisions concerning 100 points from 
their initial capital. Points had to be distributed between two options: a safe option and a 
risky option. Investment in the risky option could either result in gains of 2.5 times their 
investment (with probability =1/3) or result in the loss of the invested points. Dependent 
on treatment, participants had  to either make a new decision each round (High) or to fix 
their decision in rounds 1, 4, 7, 10 and 13 for the next three consecutive rounds (Medium 
and Low).  
The Medium and Low treatments differed in how investment outcomes were presented. 
In the Medium treatment, participant saw their gains and loses for every round, and had 
to press a button to proceed from one round to the next. In the Low treatment, 
participants passed through three consecutive screens informing them only about the 
number of the current round (“This is round 4”). They then received information 
concerning aggregate gains or losses over the last three rounds (“In the last three rounds 
you earned (lost) … points”). After participants had read the instructions for their 
treatment, they answered a number of control questions and were invited to address any 
remaining questions to the experimenter.  
To keep feedback comparable across treatment, outcomes from investment were 
predetermined by random sequences that were equally distributed across treatments. 
                                                 
5
 The code derived from this information ensured a unique matching while also guaranteeing anonymity. 
PSYCHOLOGICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL DETERMINANTS OF MYOPIC LOSS AVERSION 
 8/29 
Predictions and Hypothesis 
In the following section, we will describe our hypothesis and predictions concerning 
behavior in the investment task and the anticipated interactions of personality traits, 
emotions, and behavior. 
Choices: Expected value maximization predicts the selection of option B. Expected 
utility maximization, however, should lead to the selection of either option A or option B, 
dependent on the individual‟s level of risk aversion. This implies that either everything or 
nothing should be invested. However, experiments of budget allocations across two 
comparable options have already shown that the majority of participants actually choose 
non extreme investment (Hopfensitz & van Winden, 2008).  
Following our previous discussion of myopic loss aversion and earlier experimental 
results, we expected to see differences between treatments High and Low. Indeed, 
investment is expected to be higher when aggregate feedback is given; however, it is not 
clear if this effect is due to learning or anticipation. Since past research has shown that 
humans are not very good in anticipating their future emotional states (Loewenstein & 
Schkade, 1999), we expected the effect to be only partly due to anticipation. In addition, 
we expected experiences from early rounds to play an important role. How treatment 
Medium should affect investment behavior is less clear. If lack of performance 
information and thus protection from potentially negative emotional experiences due to 
losses drives the effects of myopic loss aversion, we would expect Medium to be similar 
to treatment High. If, however, the effect of MLA if mainly due to lack of investor 
flexibility, which in turn reduces overreactions to either gains or losses, we would expect 
Medium to be closer to treatment Low. Earlier experimental studies have shown evidence 
for both possibilities. Bellmare et al (2005) concluded that behavior in Medium is similar 
to High, while Langer and Weber (forthcoming) found the opposite effect. 
We therefore have the following hypotheses concerning investment behavior across 
feedback treatments: 
H1: Overall investment is higher with aggregate feedback (High) than with detailed 
feedback and investment flexibility (Low). Allowing for feedback but restricting flexibility 
(Medium) might be sufficient to compensate the effect of myopic loss aversion. 
H2: Humans are limited in their ability to predict future emotional states. We therefore 
expect myopic loss aversion to increase over time. In addition, participants who 
encounter many negative events in early rounds and thereby profit from an aggregate 
presentation of earnings, should show stronger myopic loss aversion.  
Emotions: Myopic loss aversion is based on the assumption that losses are experienced 
as worse than the pleasure obtained from equal sized gains, and that aggregate feedback 
reduces the pains from losses. We therefore expect that participants will experience less 
negative emotions in treatment Low compared with treatment High and Medium. We will 
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also test the assumptions, that experiencing negative or positive emotions will predict 
future investment.  
This leads us to the following hypotheses: 
H3: Aggregate feedback will lead to the experience of less negative emotions. Therefore, 
participants in the Low condition will report less negative emotions than participants in 
the High and Medium treatments. 
H4: Differences in experienced emotions are related to behavioral differences. Therefore 
we expect to be able to predict future behavior based on emotional reactions. 
Personality: While the literature has considered myopic loss aversion to be a general 
phenomenon, the aim of this study is to challenge this claim. We therefore hypothesize 
that myopic loss aversion will only be present for individuals with certain personality 
characteristics. In this study, we will focus on 'self-efficacy', and hypothesize that 
participants exhibiting high self-efficacy will be less vulnerable to myopic loss aversion 
than participants with low self-efficacy. 
H5: Myopic loss aversion is not a general phenomenon but will depend on personality. 
Participants with high self-efficacy will get less influenced by losses and feedback 
frequency than those with low self-efficacy. 
We will now turn to the results from our experiment. 
5. Results 
5.1. Investment 
Does behavior in our experiment replicate the observed treatment differences concerning 
low and high feedback from previous experiments? Table 1 and Figure 2 summarize 
investment behavior by treatment for the five blocks of three rounds. Average investment 
across all rounds was: 50.13 (High), 54.20 (Medium) and 54.87 (Low). Differences 
across treatments were not significant (Mann-Whitney test
6
, p > 0.418) neither for 
average investment over all rounds, nor for any individual block of three rounds. This 
means that, contrary to previous research, we do not find a general effect of myopic loss 
aversion. Given the strong previous evidence of its existence we will therefore have to 
consider that myopic loss aversion might depend on certain external circumstances or on 
individual characteristics. We will discuss these possibilities below. Our conclusions 
concerning Hypothesis 1 can be summarized as: 
RESULT 1: We observed no overall effect of feedback on investment behavior. Average 
investment is the same in all three treatments. 
                                                 
6
 All tests in this paper are (if not otherwise noted) two-sided. 
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Not only were average investments the same in all three treatments; we also did not 
observe changes over time (see Figure 2: B). Moreover, participants could experience 
more or less frequent gains or losses in early rounds of the experiment. Since more 
frequent gains in early rounds might lead to less aversive reactions to frequent feedback, 
we expected that only participants who were initially exposed to frequent losses would 
profit from aggregate feedback in future rounds. In our experiment, 63% of the 
participants encountered more than two successive rounds with losses during the first six 
rounds (the first two blocks of our experiment).
7
 When we compared future investment 
behavior for these two groups, we observed a striking difference (see Figure 3). While 
participants that encountered frequent gains during the first six rounds showed no 
differences across feedback conditions, we observed the predicted pattern of myopic loss 
aversion for participants initially facing frequent losses.  
For participants facing initial losses, average investment over rounds 7 to 15 was: High: 
40.3, Medium: 59.8, and Low: 55.5. Tests confirm that investment is higher in the 
Medium and Low treatments compared to High (Mann-Whitney test, p<0.049, for all test 
results see Table 2). For 'lucky' participants, we find no effect (investment rounds 7 to 15: 
High: 72.6, Medium: 55.7, Low: 56.9). Investment in High is overall higher when 
participants were initially lucky (Mann-Whitney, p=0.009), while initial events have no 
impact in the Medium and Low treatments (Mann-Whitney, p>0.386).
8
 Similarly, Langer 
and Weber (2001) showed that an aggregate presentation of a gamble is less accepted 
when the gamble is characterized by a small probability of high losses. A repetition of 
such a gamble will result in a large number of winning rounds (with an occasional high 
loss), which might be similar to our lucky participants. Figure 4 illustrates the shift in the 
investment distribution in treatments Low and High from round 1 to round 15.  Thus, in 
treatment High, investment in the last round is either positively or negatively skewed 
dependent on initial rounds. In treatment Low, initial rounds show no effect on the 
distribution in the final round. 
RESULT 2: Participants who initially encountering more than two successive rounds of 
losses, exhibit the behavior patterns typically ascribed to myopic loss aversion. 
Participants that are “lucky” during the first six rounds, and encounter few losses, show 
no such effect.  
                                                 
7
 72 out of 114 participants encountered more than two successive rounds of looses in the first six rounds. 
This ratio was very similar across treatments. For the three treatments 'unlucky' versus 'lucky' participants 
were distributed as follows: High: 24 (unlucky)/14 (lucky); Medium: 22 (unlucky)/15 (lucky); Low: 26 
(unlucky)/13 (lucky). 
8
 The difference between treatment High and treatments Medium and Low is not significant for the case of 
initially lucky outcomes (Mann-Whitney, p>0.14). However note that our number of observations is much 
smaller for „lucky‟ cases then for „unlucky‟ cases.  
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5.2. Emotions and evaluations 
We will now turn to our measures of emotions and evaluations during the experiment to 
investigate if we can find evidence for variations in emotional reactions when feedback 
and flexibility are altered. 
Because participants were required to select only one (main) emotion out of a list of 
emotion terms, we first report which emotions were chosen. Joy, hope, disappointment, 
regret and surprise are the predominantly reported emotion terms (see Table 3:A). Across 
treatments we observe that joy is more often reported in treatments Low and Medium 
(Kruskal-Wallis, p= 0.008) and that worry and irritation, has a tendency to be more often 
reported in treatment High (Kruskal-Wallis, worry: p=0.021; irritation: p=0.051). 
Grouping emotions dependent on them generally being considered to be negatively 
(shame, regret, irritation, worry and disappointment) or positively valenced (joy, pride 
and hope) gives even stronger results (see Table 3:B)
9
. Negative emotions are 
significantly more often reported in treatment High (Kruskal-Wallis, p=0.004) while 
positive emotions are more often reported in treatments Medium and Low (Kruskal-
Wallis, p=0.031). With respect to Hypothesis 3 we therefore conclude: 
RESULT 3: As myopic loss aversion predicts, aggregate feedback (Low) increases 
positive emotions and decreases negative emotions. However positive emotions are also 
increased if feedback is given frequently but choices cannot be adjusted (Medium). 
Myopic loss aversion correctly predicts less negative emotional reactions when losses are 
not directly observed; however, it is not clear if emotional experience will predict future 
investment behavior. We therefore regressed investment at time t (with t=4, 7, 10 and 
13), on emotions experienced after the previous block of three rounds. We see that 
emotions do not predict investment (see Table 4). Thus, even though emotional reactions 
are dependent on treatment, they are not related to behavior. In other words, we observe 
no interaction between emotional experience and investment behavior. 
RESULT 4: Emotional experience cannot predict future investment decisions.  
Emotions are elicited as predicted by loss aversion, however cannot explain behavior. 
Since we also asked participants to evaluate their expectations concerning future 
investment rounds, we can compare the predictive power of these evaluations to the 
emotional experience. We observe that evaluations concerning the future
10
 (i.e. answers 
to the questions: "What are you expectations concerning the future?" and "What is your 
confidence in reaching your goal?") are strongly correlated with overall investment 
(Spearman: +0.30; p=0.001). Moreover, evaluation of future events at time t-1, 
significantly predict investment at time t (Table 6). For a detailed discussion of the 
                                                 
9
 We leave surprise out of this classification, since in can fall in either category. 
10
 Factor analysis confirms that appraisals concerning past events and appraisals concerning future events 
can be represented by two separate factors (Table 5). We therefore generate two grouped variables: 
appraisal_past_events and appraisal_future_events that consist of mean values of the elements of each 
factor. 
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precise interaction dynamics between emotions, evaluations, and personality we refer to 
Wranik and Hopfensitz (2008). We summarize with the following result: 
RESULT 5: Evaluations of future investment rounds can predict investment behavior in 
future rounds and are related to overall investment.  
5.3. Personality and investment 
Positive evaluations and optimism concerning the future are generally related to personal 
characteristics (Carver & Scheier, 2002; Seligman & Csikszentmihalyi, 2000). Thus, after 
having observed that optimistic future evaluations can predict investment choices, we 
examined the personality profiles responsible for such optimistic evaluations. Our 
hypothesis is that the personality construct of “self-efficacy”, which includes specific 
confidence in decision-making abilities, general optimism, and lack of anxiety, will result 
in more positive evaluations of the future.  
Specific confidence in decision-making abilities was measured by the question at the 
beginning of the task: "How confident are you in your ability to generally make good 
decisions?" As expected, individuals with high scores on this question also present low 
anxiety (STAI trait; Spearman: -0.546, p < 0.001) and high optimism (LOT-R; Spearman: 
0.366, p < 0.001).
11
 In addition, self-efficacy is correlated with evaluations concerning 
the future (Spearman: +0.651, p < 0.000) and with overall investment. Thus, while 
participant scoring below mean self-efficacy (N=55) invested 45.47 points on average, 
participants above mean self-efficacy (N=59) decided to invest 60.16 points on average. 
This difference is highly significant (Mann-Whitney: p=0.006). 
Given these observations, we expected that individuals with high self-efficacy will 
continue to invest larger sums in future rounds, independent of feedback frequency. 
Figure 5 summarizes investment for participants scoring either above mean or below 
mean self-efficacy. Participants scoring above mean self-efficacy show no behavioral 
differences for different feedback frequencies. However, we observe a strong effect of 
myopic loss aversion for participants with below mean self-efficacy (Mann-Whitney, 
High vs. Low: p=0.049, High vs. Medium: p=0.032). This effect is amplified if we focus 
on those participants who had initially encountered more than two successive losses 
(Mann-Whitney, High vs. Low: p=0.005, High vs. Medium: p=0.002).
12
 
RESULT 6: Investors present large variability in self-efficacy, a personality profile 
characterized by specific confidence in decision-making abilities, general optimism, and 
lack of anxiety. Participants with low self-efficacy show a strong reaction to feedback 
                                                 
11
 In a debriefing questionnaire we also asked participants about: (1) their experience concerning 
investment; (2) their interest in investment; (3) their competence regarding mathematics and statistics and 
(4) how much they enjoy topics related to investment and finance. Positive answers to these questions are 
strongly correlated with high ratings concerning 'power' (Spearman, +0.33, p<0.001). Also men report 
higher levels of power than women (Mann-Whitney, p=0.009). 
12
 However the inverse myopic loss aversion effect is not significant, i.e. the difference between treatment 
High and treatments Medium and Low is not significant for the case of initially lucky outcomes (Mann-
Whitney, p>0.14). This might though be due to the reduced number of observations for this case.  
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frequency and flexibility and exhibit characteristic myopic loss aversion behaviors. 
Participants with high scores on self-efficacy are not influenced by feedback frequency 
and flexibility and show no evidence of myopic loss aversion. 
 
6. Discussion and Conclusion 
In this paper, we discussed the psychological and environmental determinants of myopic 
loss aversion. We report two main results: First, myopic loss aversion is influenced by 
outcomes from early rounds of the experiment. This 'priming' effect leads to myopic loss 
aversion only when initial rounds resulted in relatively unlucky outcomes. In particular, 
aggregate feedback and reduced flexibility are obscuring losses and are only effective if 
losses are frequent. In contrast, we observe an almost reversed effect of myopic loss 
aversion when returns during initial rounds are lucky. Under conditions with reduced 
flexibility (Low), participants invest to a similar degree whether they were initially lucky 
or unlucky. In contrast, participants with detailed information about their gains and the 
option to react to them immediately (High), are motivated to invest more when they are 
initially lucky. Since other experimental studies did not control for the effect of past 
experience on overall investment, differences across treatments and studies might be 
partially explained by random differences in the order of gains and losses (Langer & 
Weber, forthcoming).  
Our second result concerns the psychological determinants of myopic loss aversion. We 
investigated the relation between character traits, evaluations, emotional responses, and 
investment behavior and identified a specific personality profile, self-efficacy, which 
predicts myopic loss aversion. Self-efficacy is characterized by specific confidence in 
decision-making abilities, general optimism, and lack of anxiety. Low self-efficacy 
participants are characterized by uncertainty and pessimism about the future, and react 
strongly to detailed feedback, especially if this feedback is initially negative. 
Consequently, these low self-efficacy participants profit most from aggregate feedback 
and reduced flexibility. Their investment in the risky option and hence their earnings are 
substantially higher when decisions can only be changed every three rounds. 
Evaluations and emotions measured during the task are essential to understand the 
mechanisms underlying this effect. For example, we observe that joy is least often 
reported in the High treatment. Moreover, joy is significantly higher in the Medium 
treatment, even though participants witnessed the same number of wins in both 
treatments. Since participants can immediately react to winning rounds in the High 
treatment, they can also regret this action afterwards, which could explain the lower 
levels of joy. Finally, the larger number of joyful experiences does not predict investment 
behavior. In sum, the assumption that reduced feedback will make a risky option feel 
„better‟ is confirmed; however, this is not the driving force behind increased investment.  
Higher investment levels under reduced flexibility are mainly due to differences in how 
future events are appraised. Insecure participants show increased confidence concerning 
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future rounds when aggregate feedback is given, or if they were not allowed to react 
immediately to outcomes. This increase in confidence leads to higher investment and can 
help explain the effects of myopic loss aversion.  
Our results address the same concept, confidence concerning the future, with two 
different mechanisms. Confidence is related to more frequent trades (Barber & Odean, 
2001) and partially explains why prices exceed their expected value (Gneezy et al., 
2003). Similarly, our initially lucky participants are not negatively influenced by frequent 
feedback. This is because positive feedback increases confidence about future rounds. 
However, initially unlucky periods will decrease confidence, especially when participants 
are already insecure about their abilities (e.g., low self-efficacy). This means that advisors 
must increase investor confidence if they want to increase investment in risky but high 
return options. This is especially true for those investors who are insecure and show low 
self-efficacy. One way to increase confidence is to reduce flexibility and present 
aggregate feedback. However other methods might be just as effective or even more 
effective. For example, providing potential investors with detailed information and 
education about financial markets and investment strategies could result in comparable 
effects. 
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Appendix 
A. Instructions: 
General instructions 
Welcome: you are about to take part in a decision making experiment, in which you can 
earn real money. The amount of money you can earn will depend on the decisions you 
make.  
Dependent on the quality of your decisions, you can earn up to 70 CHF. 
During the experiment your earnings will be calculated in Unige Francs (UGF). At the 
end of the session, these UGF will be converted into CHF and your earnings will be paid 
out to you in CHF using the following exchange rate: 
100 UGF = 1.33 CHF 
At the beginning of the experiment you will receive from us 20 CHF, which =1500 UGF. 
This is your capital stock. You can decide to either keep these UGF or to invest them in 
the experiment and try and earn more money. The details of this investment procedure 
will be explained to you below. At the end of the experiment we will pay you any 
earnings that you accumulated in addition to your 1500 UGF capital stock. If you loose 
money during the experiment, you will have to pay us back the losses from your capital 
stock at the end of the experiment. 
During the experiment we will also ask you to answer a number of questions. These 
questions concern what you think and how you feel.  
There are no right or wrong answers. You need to follow the decision strategy that feels 
right to you and to make those choices that come natural and that seem like the best 
choices for you. In addition, you should report those evaluations and emotions that are 
closest to your real thoughts and feelings. All answers are completely anonymous and 
confidential. 
Instructions 
During this experiment you will have to make investment decisions for 15 rounds. In 
each of these rounds, you can invest 100 UGF from your capital stock of 1500 UGF. 
Each round you have to decide how you want to split these 100 UGF over two investment 
options. 
We will call the two options: option A and option B. 
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Option A: In this option you will neither gain nor loose money. In other words, will 
always keep the number of UGF you put into option A. 
Option B: The outcome from this option will be determined at the end of each round. In 
particular, we will pick one random number between 1 and 6. This is equivalent to rolling 
a dice. 
 If the number is 1 or 2 (that is in 1/3 of the cases) the UGF you placed in this 
option will be multiplied by 2.5. You will then receive 2.5 times the number of 
UGF you put into option B, in addition to the number of UGF you originally 
placed into this option. 
 If the number is 3, 4, 5 or 6 (that is in 2/3 of the cases) you will lose the number 
of UGF you put into option B. 
Example 
Imagine that in one round, you decide to split your 100 UGF by placing 50 UGF into 
option A and 50 UGF into option B.  
If the random number turns out to be either 1 or 2, you will receive 2.5*50 = 125, in 
addition to your 100 UGF for that round. Your capital stock will therefore increase by 
125 UGF.  
If the random number turns out to be either 3, 4, 5 or 6, you will lose the 50 UGF you put 
in option B. Your capital stock will therefore decrease by 50 UGF. 
Summary 
 In each round, you can decide how to split 100 UGF of your capital stock between 
two options.  
 At the end of each round we will pick a random number between 1 and 6. 
 If the number is 1 or 2 your earnings will be: 
100 UGF + 2.5 * the number of UGF you placed into option B 
 If the number is 3, 4, 5 or 6 your earnings will be: 
100 UGF – the number of UGF you placed into option B 
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B. Questions: 
B.1. Emotion questions: 
Which of these most closely captures your current emotional state (select one and rate 
intensity on scale from 0 to 100): 
 Shame 
 Joy 
 Regret 
 Pride 
 Irritation – anger 
 Hope 
 Worry – Anxiety  
 Surprise 
 Disappointment 
B. 2. Questions before first round: 
1. How important is it for you to do well in this task 
not at all important     very important  
 
2. How important is it for you to earn as much money as possible 
not at all important     very important 
 
3. How well do you think you will do in this task 
very poorly       very well 
 
4. Compared to the other individuals who will participate in this task, how well do you 
think that you will do 
much worse      much better 
 
5. How much money would you like to earn in this task 
I do not care       the maximum amount possible 
 
6. How confident are you in your ability to generally make good decisions 
not very confident     very confident 
 
B. 3. Appraisal questions between rounds: 
 
1. The outcome from these last three rounds is  
very negative      very positive  
 
2. The outcome from these last three rounds is  
very unfair     very fair  
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3. My performance so far is 
much worse than I expected    much better than I expected 
 
4. The outcome from these last three rounds is 
very negative for my overall goal   very positive for my overall goal 
 
5. My performance so far is caused by 
me making bad decisions   me making good decisions  
 
6. My performance so far is caused by  
extremely bad luck     extremely good luck  
 
7. In the next three rounds, I expect to do  
much worse      much better 
 
8. In my ability to reach my goal at the end of this task, I feel  
very non-confident     very confident 
 
B. 4. Questions after last round 
 
1. How important was it for you to do well in this task 
    not at all important    very important 
 
2. How important was it for you to earn as much money as possible 
    not at all important    very important 
 
3. How well do you think you did in this task 
    very poorly      very well 
 
4. How satisfied are you with the decisions you made in this task 
    very dissatisfied     very satisfied 
 
5. Compared to the other individuals who participate in this task, how well do you think 
that you did 
    much worse     much better 
 
6. Do your earnings reflect the quality of the decisions you made in this task 
    not at all      yes, absolutely 
 
7. How fair was the overall task 
    very unfair      very fair 
 
8. Do you have experience investing money in stocks or investment funds 
    no experience at all    a great deal of experience 
 
PSYCHOLOGICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL DETERMINANTS OF MYOPIC LOSS AVERSION 
 19/29 
9. Are you interested in finance and investment 
    not at all interested    very interested 
 
10. How competent are you in the domains of mathematics and statistics 
    very incompetent     very competent 
 
11. Do you enjoy conversations about finance and investment 
    not at all      yes, absolutely 
B. 5. Personality traits collected during first session: 
1. STAI (anxiety) 
2. MBSS (monitoring - blunting) 
3. Looming scale 
4. DERS (Difficulties in Emotion Regulation) 
5. LOT (life orientation test) 
6. UPPS (impulsivity: Urgency, lack of Premeditation, and Sensation Seeking) 
7. BFI (Big five) 
8. ERQ (Emotion Recognition Questionnaire) 
9. ASQ (Attribution Style) 
10. STAXI (anger) 
B. 6. Screen shot of investment screen (treatment: High): 
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Figure 2:  A: Histograms of average investment across treatments; B: Investment across time 
by treatment. For treatment High, averages over intervals of three rounds are shown.
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Figure 1:  Overview of treatments and self report measures taken during experimental task.
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Figure 3: Investment by treatment dependent on number of gains in early rounds. A: Subjects
experiencing at most two successive losses in first six rounds. B: Subjects experiencing more
than two successive losses in first six rounds.
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Figure 5: Investment across treatments for participants scoring above or below mean self -efficacy. 
Top two graphs: all observations; bottom two graphs: only observations from participants
encountering more than two succesive losses in first six rounds.
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High Medium Low High vs 
Low
High vs 
Medium
Low vs 
Medium
(N=38) (N=37) (N=39) Mann-Whitney test (p = ):
invest 1-3: 49.25 
(27.66)
44.86 
(25.59)
52.85 
(26.20) 0.430 0.672 0.297
invest 4-6: 51.28 
(29.33)
54.22 
(28.51)
52.33 
(30.62) 0.886 0.602 0.710
invest 7-9: 50.24 
(31.00)
55.84 
(28.46)
57.82 
(30.37) 0.296 0.394 0.681
invest 10-12: 49.07 
(31.04)
55.81 
(30.29)
56.18 
(33.57) 0.371 0.352 0.887
invest 13-15: 50.81 
(35.33)
60.27 
(30.84)
55.15 
(32.81) 0.529 0.199 0.527
overall invest 50.13 
(27.87)
54.20 
(20.58)
54.87 
(26.57) 0.463 0.417 0.904
Table 1. Overview of mean investment across rounds and treatments (standard deviation in 
parenthesis).
A. more than two successive losses in first six rounds :
High Medium Low High vs
Low
High vs
Medium
Low vs
Medium
(N=24) (N=22) (N=26) Mann-Whitney test (p = )
invest 1-3 41.94 41.82 53.88 0.073 0.791 0.165
invest 4-6 46.68 54.14 55.04 0.381 0.332 0.992
invest 7-9 42.18 54.36 59.81 0.046 0.123 0.516
invest 10-12 40.54 61.59 52.54 0.243 0.021 0.381
invest 13-15 38.08 63.41 54.27 0.064 0.008 0.370
overall invest 41.89 55.06 55.11 0.084 0.059 0.951
B. at most two successive losses in first six rounds :
High Medium Low High vs
Low
High vs
Medium
Low vs
Medium
(N=14) (N=15) (N=13) Mann-Whitney test (p = )
invest 1-3 61.79 49.33 50.77 0.316 0.166 0.943
invest 4-6 59.17 54.33 46.92 0.285 0.600 0.473
invest 7-9 64.05 58.00 53.85 0.354 0.402 0.871
invest 10-12 63.69 47.33 63.46 0.865 0.149 0.195
invest 13-15 72.62 55.67 56.92 0.202 0.134 0.926
overall invest 64.26 52.93 54.38 0.423 0.138 0.596
Table 2. Overview of mean investment across rounds and treatments split for A: participants
encountering more than two successive losses in first six rounds and B: participants
encountering at most two successive losses in first six rounds
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A: High (N=190) Medium (N=185) Low (N=195)
joy 12.11 % 24.32 % 28.72 %
hope 21.05 % 20.00 % 17.44 %
disappointment 16.82 % 15.68 % 15.90 %
regret 15.79 % 15.14 % 11.28 %
surprise 9.47 % 8.65 % 13.85 %
irritation 8.95 % 7.03 % 2.05 %
worry 8.42 % 3.78 % 2.05 %
pride 6.32 % 4.86 % 8.21 %
shame 1.05 % 0.54 % 0.51 %
B:
positive emotions 39.47 % 49.19 % 54.36 %
negative emotions 51.05 % 42.16 % 31.79 %
Table 3. Percentage of reported emotions across treatments.
Table 4. Random effects GLS regression of investment at time t, on different emotions 
being experienced after feedback t-1 and treatments.
R-squared:
within: 0.030 Number of observations 456
between: 0.001 number of groups 114
overall: 0.008 Prob > chi2 = 0.421
invest time t Coef. Std. Err. P>|z|
joy -10.214 11.194 0.362
hope -5.434 11.241 0.629
disappointment -9.012 11.352 0.427
regret -7.136 11.488 0.534
surprise -5.336 11.385 0.639
irritation -6.944 11.779 0.556
worry -10.998 11.776 0.350
pride -19.504 11.921 0.102
dummy_medium 2.328 6.377 0.715
dummy_low 1.528 6.313 0.809
constant 62.513 11.760 0.000
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Variable Factor 1 Factor 2 
proportion of variance explained: 0.844 0.269       
positive 0.844    0.058
fair 0.441    0.242
performance 0.835    0.081
goal 0.840    0.023
decision 0.644    0.435
lucky 0.793    0.112
expect -0.166    0.624
confident 0.263    0.663
Overall KMO measure = 0.86
Table 5: Rotated factor loadings of evaluations (using Varimax rotation). Factor 1 
representing evaluations concerning past events and Factor 2 representing evaluations 
concerning future events.
Table 6: Random effects regression of investment at time t, on evaluations at t-1.
R-sq: within = 0.0098 Number of observations 570
overall = 0.0545 Number of groups 114
invest at time t Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z|
evaluations past (t-1) -0.017 0.011 -1.49 0.136 
evaluations future (t-1) 0.126 0.046 2.76 0.006
constant 45.890 6.673 6.88 0.000
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